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ATTORNEY-GENERAL V TAMIL X 
Ella Watt* 
This article considers Attorney-General v Tamil X, a recent New Zealand Supreme Court decision 
on refugee status determinations. Specifically, it considers the approach taken to art 1F of the 
Refugee Convention in decisions on the exclusion of claimants from refugee status. As claims are 
increasingly affected by art 1F considerations, it is imperative that the law in this complicated area 
is clear and just. This article traces Tamil X's advancement through the courts, and presents an 
analysis of the Supreme Court's judgment. The article also recommends some future developments 
for the jurisprudence on the exclusion clauses, specifically the adoption of a modified version of the 
ICTY jurisprudence on joint criminal enterprise.  
I INTRODUCTION 
Refugee law protects the most vulnerable people in society. It provides, for those who fear 
persecution in their home States, a catalogue of rights and protections in a safe country elsewhere. It 
aims to ensure that those who cannot be protected by their State, through no fault of their own, will 
be protected by the international community. But conflicts are increasingly complex, and atrocities 
are frequently committed by both sides in combat. Fault is becoming harder to determine and it is 
harder and harder to distinguish the persecutors from the persecuted.  
In this context, Attorney-General v Tamil X is an important recent decision of the Supreme 
Court of New Zealand.1 The case addressed art 1F of the Convention Relating to the Status of 
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1  Attorney-General v Tamil X [2010] NZSC 107, [2011] 1 NZLR 721.  
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Refugees 1951 (the Refugee Convention),2 which excludes war criminals and the perpetrators of 
serious non-political crimes from refugee status. Efforts are made for global consistency in the 
application of the Refugee Convention, so the Tamil X decision, which created an effective fusion of 
the law on art 1F from several jurisdictions, will be a leading decision in New Zealand and 
internationally.  
In New Zealand particularly, under the Immigration Act 2009, there is currently substantial 
doubt about the protection which will be given to excluded asylum seekers. The application of the 
exclusion clauses will determine who is granted refugee status, and who is potentially returned to 
face persecution, torture or arbitrary deprivation of life. In our "new world disorder",3 the clear and 
appropriate application of art 1F is vital for the protection of genuine refugees. 
This article will first present the facts of the case and follow the progression of Tamil X through 
the courts. In doing so, this article will not address questions of the standard of judicial review, 
though they are raised in the case, but will focus on the impact of international criminal law on 
refugee status determinations under art 1F. Secondly, it will analyse the Supreme Court's approach 
to art 1F in the case. Finally, it will assess whether the Supreme Court's approach is the best way to 
protect refugees, and will conclude by making several suggestions for improvements to the law as 
stated in Tamil X.  
II A REVIEW OF TAMIL X  
A Facts 
X is a citizen of Sri Lanka, who made an application for refugee status in New Zealand in 2001. 
The relevant facts began in 1992, when he served as the Chief Engineer on the MV Yahata, the 
"finest vessel" owned by the Tamil Tigers.4 This vessel repeatedly travelled routes in South Asia, 
transporting standard commercial goods, as well as munitions and weapons for the Tamil Tigers' 
use. On only one occasion is it certain that the vessel carried arms and munitions, and this is on the 
Yahata's last voyage.5 X claims that he was unaware of the cargo the Yahata carried prior to the 
final voyage, and that he had no knowledge of the nature of the cargo when the final voyage from 
Phuket began. Soon after departure, he was informed that the vessel belonged to the Tamil Tigers 
  
2  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 137 (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 
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3  James C Hathaway and Colin J Harvey "Framing Refugee Protection in the New World Disorder" (2001) 
34 Cornell Int LJ 257 at 257.  
4  Refugee Appeal No 74796 RSAA 74796, 19 April 2006 at [31]. 
5  Attorney-General v Tamil X, above n 1, at [78]. 
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and was carrying arms and munitions. He was also informed that he could not leave until the ship 
arrived in Sri Lanka.6   
Before reaching Sri Lanka, the ship was intercepted by the Indian coast-guard. They requested 
to board the vessel, were denied access and were warned that the vessel carried 110 tonnes of 
explosives.7 The Yahata fled, followed by several Indian Navy vessels, eventually anchoring near 
Chennai, India. After a small-arms fire fight, the Yahata caught alight. X and the rest of the crew 
abandoned the vessel, and were subsequently rescued from the ocean and placed in custody. The 10 
Tamil Tigers members who had boarded at Phuket remained on board, and perished as the ship 
sank.8   
X and others were prosecuted in the Indian courts, and X served three years imprisonment for 
his role in the destruction of the vessel.9 Having served his sentence he left India for Singapore, and 
Singapore for New Zealand, arriving on a visitor's permit on 13 September 2001. 10  Shortly 
afterwards, his wife and children arrived in New Zealand on visitor's visas, and X made an 
application for refugee status for himself and his family. X was denied refugee status in the first 
instance for lack of satisfaction of a real chance that he would be persecuted if he returned to Sri 
Lanka. If denied refugee status, Yarwood states that X and his wife risked being "returned to the[ir] 
state of origin with the shadow of ... [their] crimes hanging above them".11 Seeking protection, X 
appealed the decision before the Refugee Status Appeals Authority (the RSAA).  
B The Refugee Status Appeals Authority Decision  
At the RSAA, X was found to have been complicit in crimes against humanity committed by the 
Tamil Tigers.12 X accepted before the RSAA that he was aware of the Tamil Tigers' crimes against 
humanity. However, he denied being a Tamil Tigers supporter, denied he knew that the Yahata was 
a Tamil Tigers' vessel when the final voyage began, and denied any knowledge of the nature of the 
cargo that he was transporting.13  
  
6  Refugee Appeal No 74796, above n 4, at [41]. 
7  At [55].  
8  At [45]. 
9  At [46]. 
10  At [47]. 
11  Lisa Yarwood "The Tamil X Case" [2010] NZLJ 7 at 7. 
12  Refugee Appeal No 74796, above n 4, at [128]. 
13  At [43]. 
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X's claims of lack of knowledge were not believed by the RSAA, 14 which doubted that he 
would have been accepted to work on the vessel if the Tamil Tigers were uncertain of his loyalty, 15 
and that he could work aboard the ship for six months unaware of what cargo was carried.16 The 
RSAA stated that at best he "deliberately turned a blind eye to the obvious"17 and inferred that X 
was a trusted member of the Tamil Tigers.  
The RSAA followed the Canadian authority from Musagera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration)18 on crimes against humanity, which required a proscribed act, committed as part 
of a widespread attack directed against civilians, in which the claimant participates knowing or 
risking that the widespread attack will occur.19 The RSAA excluded X from refugee status under art 
1F(a) because he knew that the arms which he was helping to smuggle would as likely as not be 
used by the Tamil Tigers to commit crimes against humanity. The RSAA therefore concluded that 
there were serious reasons for considering X was a knowing accomplice,20 and that he was liable as 
a party to crimes against humanity committed by the Tamil Tigers, by virtue of his participation as 
Chief Engineer of the Yahata.21  
The RSAA also found that if its assessment under art 1F(a) was incorrect, X was nevertheless 
excluded under art 1F(b) due to his role in the destruction of the Yahata, an act which the RSAA 
ruled was "committed to destroy the vessel and its cargo and to thereby prevent their seizure",22 
which they found not to constitute a political purpose.  
III ARTICLE 1F OF THE REFUGEE CONVENTION 
This section will provide an overview of art 1F in the context of the Refugee Convention. 
Generally, refugee status is granted to all persons who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion",23 are outside their nation, and unable to return to it without fear for their safety or 
  
14  At [61]. 
15  At [62]. 
16  At [63]. 
17  At [64]. 
18  Musagera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 SCR 100.  
19 At [119]. 
20  Refugee Appeal No 74796, above n 4, at [64]. 
21  At [128]. 
22  At [141]. 
23  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, above n 2, art 1A(2). 
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their lives. If refugee status is granted, rights similar to those of citizens24 or of legally present 
foreign nationals, 25as appropriate, are granted to the claimant under the Refugee Convention. 
Exceptions stating who cannot be granted refugee status are contained in arts 1D, 1E and 1F. 
Articles 1D and 1E deal with persons who are not in need of protection, while art 1F deals with 
persons who are not deserving of protection. The present case is concerned with exclusion under art 
1F of the Refugee Convention, which reads:26 
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious 
reasons for considering that: 
(a) He has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as defined in the 
international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes; 
(b) He has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission 
to that country as a refugee; 
(c) He has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
There is an element of international morality implicit in art 1F that is absent in the other 
exclusion clauses, which renders art 1F controversial. 27  It is a provision of "enormous 
complexity" 28 due to the need to negotiate the cross-over between international criminal law, 
international human rights law, international humanitarian law and national immigration 
requirements in its application. The article is widely agreed to have a double purpose, an 
understanding of which is central to its correct application. The United Nations High Commission 
on Refugees, in its guidelines intended to provide interpretive guidance to governments, decision-
makers and the judiciary, states:29  
The rationale behind the exclusion clauses is twofold. Firstly, certain acts are so grave that they render 
their perpetrators undeserving of international protection as refugees. Secondly, the refugee framework 
should not stand in the way of serious criminals facing justice. 
  
24  Articles 4, 12, 14, 16(2), 20, 22, 23, 24 and 29.  
25  Articles 7, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21 and 26.  
26  Article 1F. 
27  JC Hathaway The Law of Refugee Status (Butterworths, Toronto, 1991) at 214. 
28  James C Simeon "Complicity and Culpability and the Exclusion of Terrorists from Convention Refugee 
Status Post-9/11" (2010) 29 Refugee Survey Quarterly 104 at 132. 
29  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees "Guidelines on International Protection: Application of 
the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees" (4 September 
2003) UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency <www.unhcr.org> at [3]. 
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And in a passage adopted by the Supreme Court in Tamil X, James Hathaway, in his seminal 
work, describes the purpose of exclusion as:30 
... rooted in both a commitment to the promotion of an international morality and a pragmatic 
recognition that states are unlikely to agree to be bound by a regime which requires them to protect 
undesirable refugees. 
Following the Second World War, States shared a desire that "war criminals should not be 
protected",31 and to retain the ability to deny admission to their territory to criminals who may 
create a risk to society.32 The Refugee Convention is accepted to intend to exclude those who are 
deemed unworthy or "undeserving"33 of international protection from refugee status. "Those whose 
acts have created refugees"34 and who can be described as morally culpable are excluded under art 
1F(a), while those excluded under art 1F(b) are considered "undesirable"35 by States due to their 
criminality. If arts 1F(a), (b) or (c) apply, an asylum seeker cannot be granted refugee status.  
Any discussion of the application of the exclusion clauses in the Refugee Convention must 
consider the underlying tension that exists between exclusion under art 1F and the concept of non-
refoulement as expressed in art 33 of the Refugee Convention, which reads:36 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.  
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, 
having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the 
community of that country. 
  
30  JC Hathaway The Law of Refugee Status, above n 27, at 214. 
31  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (2nd ed, 
UNCHR, Geneva, 1988) at [148].  
32  Ibid.  
33  James C Simeon "Complicity and Culpability and the Exclusion of Terrorists from Convention Refugee 
Status Post-9/11", above n 28, at 112. 
34  James C Simeon "Exclusion Under Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Convention in Canada" (2009) 21 IJRL 193 at 
199.  
35  JC Hathaway The Law of Refugee Status, above n 27, at 214. 
36  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, above n 2, arts 33(1) and 33(2).  
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This principle provides protection for legitimate refugees, prohibiting their return or refoulement 
to their country of origin, or any country in which they would be at risk of persecution or torture. 
Article 33(2) provides for an exception to protection from non-refoulement. If a refugee is deemed 
to be a danger to the security of the receiving country, or is convicted of a serious crime inside the 
country, that refugee can be returned despite the risk of persecution or torture.  
The non-refoulement principle is non-derogable.37 However, as art 33 only applies to those who 
are found to be legitimate refugees under art 1, art 1F effectively creates a pre-admission exemption. 
If asylum seekers are excluded under art 1F, they have no right to protection from refoulement 
under the Refugee Convention. This is controversial, as it allows for refoulement to torture for those 
who are excluded from refugee status, despite the relationship of the non-refoulement provision to 
the absolute jus cogens prohibition on torture at international law.38 It is worth noting that although 
some commentators have argued that non-refoulement has also attained peremptory norm status,39 
State party practice and the text of the Refugee Convention itself suggests that this is not the case.40  
IV DECISIONS ON TAMIL X IN THE LOWER COURTS  
A The High Court  
In the High Court, the RSAA's decision in Tamil X came under judicial review. The focus was 
on the RSAA's factual findings, and "little attention was paid to the correct legal test to be 
applied".41 The High Court concluded that it was reasonable for the RSAA to have found on the 
facts that X was complicit in crimes against humanity committed by the Tamil Tigers,42 and that he 
committed a serious non-political crime in sinking the Yahata,43 and so upheld the decision.  
The reasoning of the High Court followed that of the RSAA, holding it was implausible that the 
Tamil Tigers would employ a Chief Engineer of whose loyalty they were uncertain, and that X must 
therefore have been a willing participant in the smuggling.44 Therefore, they concluded that he was 
dedicated to the Tamil Tigers' objectives and knowingly assisted in carrying them out,45 despite 
  
37  Ibid at art 42(1).  
38  Aoife Duffy "Expulsion to Face Torture – Non-Refoulement in International Law" (2008) 20 IJRL 373 at 
379.  
39  See for example Jean Allain "Jus Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement" (2001) 13 IJRL 533.  
40  Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2) [2005] NZSC 38, [2006] 1 NZLR 289 at [51]; Aiofe Duffy "Expulsion to 
Face Torture – Non-Refoulement in International Law", above n 38, at 390.  
41  Lisa Yarwood "The Tamil X Case", above n 11, at 7.  
42  X & Y v Refugee Status Appeals Authority HC Auckland CIV-2006-404-4213, 17 December 2007 at [86].  
43  At [99]. 
44  At [54]. 
45  At [85]. 
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finding "no evidence of direct participation"46 in the crimes by X. The High Court ruled that the 
RSAA was entitled to find serious reasons for considering that X was complicit in the crimes 
against humanity committed by the Tamil Tigers.47 
The High Court, like the RSAA, followed Musagera, and held that there need be no link 
between a "specific event"48 constituting a crime committed by the Tamil Tigers and X's actions; 
rather, his involvement with the group as a willing participant in the attempt to smuggle arms was 
sufficient.49  
The High Court also found that the RSAA reasonably held that X committed a serious, non-
political crime sufficient for exclusion under art 1F(b),50 relying on his conviction by the Supreme 
Court of India, and their reasonable inference from the evidence presented that X was a loyal Tamil 
Tigers supporter.  
B The Court of Appeal  
The Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the High Court and held that it was not open to 
the RSAA to find X complicit in crimes against humanity, war crimes, or serious non-political 
crimes. The Court found that the RSAA and the High Court had "misdirected themselves in law as 
to the proper approach to the issue of complicity".51 The Court declared the Canadian authority 
outdated,52 and instead adopted the reasoning from the English Court of Appeal decision in R (JS 
(Sri Lanka)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,53 a decision highly similar on the facts, 
which dealt with a Sri Lankan asylum seeker who had smuggled arms and personnel for the Tamil 
Tigers. Central to the analysis of all three judges at the Court of Appeal was whether the Refugee 
Convention standard of "serious reasons for considering" had been met. All the judges doubted that 
there was sufficient evidence for the standard to be satisfied.  
Hammond J adopted the reasoning in the JS (Sri Lanka) judgment. He ruled that finding 
"serious reasons for considering" that an individual was excluded would require an individual to be 
party to the criminal design, making a significant contribution to the crimes with the intention of 
  
46  Lisa Yarwood "The Tamil X Case", above n 11, at 7.  
47  At [110]. 
48  X & Y v Refugee Status Appeals Authority, above n 42, at [81]. 
49  Ibid at [72]. 
50  At [99]. 
51  Tamil X v Refugee Status Appeals Authority [2009] NZCA 488, [2010] 2 NZLR 73 at [55]. 
52  At [105] per Hammond J, [245] per Baragwanath J. 
53  R (JS (Sri Lanka)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 364, [2010] 2 WLR 17.  
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furthering them.54 This was an extension of the Canadian standard used at the lower courts, which 
required only knowledge of the risk of the crimes. Hammond J found that there were no "serious 
reasons for considering" that X had committed a crime against humanity, as his participation in the 
voyage, plus the inference that he was aware of the cargo carried by the Yahata, was not enough to 
show intent to further crimes against humanity.55  
Arnold J agreed with Hammond J's finding. He ruled that even if X was aware of the nature of 
the cargo, it was not sufficiently certain that the arms would be used for the illegal purpose of action 
against civilians to find that X had intent to further the crimes.56  
Baragwanath J went further, questioning whether it was possible in law to find a joint criminal 
enterprise, given the uncertainty about the future use of the arms and ammunition. Although it is an 
international crime to smuggle arms for use against civilians, carrying the arms was not unlawful in 
itself, since the Tamil Tigers were conducting a legitimate war.57 Baragwanath J found that at most, 
there was a 50 per cent chance that the arms would be used in an illegal manner, and that, therefore, 
smuggling these arms would no more than "materially increase the risk" that a crime against 
humanity would be committed.58 Baragwanath J doubted whether this low threshold was sufficient 
to establish criminality.  
In reference to art 1F(b), the Judges differed on whether there was a political purpose to the 
crime of the scuttling of the Yahata. Baragwanath and Hammond JJ found that there was a sufficient 
link between the act and the political purpose for X not to be found liable,59 while Arnold J held 
that the link was too tenuous for the scuttling to be a political crime.60 Further, both Arnold and 
Baragwanath JJ doubted whether the evidence of the Indian Supreme Court was sufficient for X to 
be implicated in the destruction of the Yahata.  
V TAMIL X IN THE SUPREME COURT 
A Procedural Considerations 
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision, delivered by McGrath J, accepted the RSAA's 
findings of fact in relation to X, stating that its approach was "a straightforward application of its 
  
54  Tamil X v Refugee Status Appeals Authority, above n 51, at [104]. 
55  At [111].  
56  At [170].  
57  At [230].  
58  At [281].  
59  At [124] per Hammond J, [309] per Baragwanath J. 
60  At [176]. 
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specialised function",61 that its findings were "not unreasonable"62 and, therefore, not to be re-
evaluated. The review was, therefore, on the appropriate law on complicity in international crimes.  
Interestingly, the Supreme Court suggested that the applicant must establish all elements of a 
claim to refugee status, including establishing that the applicant is not subject to exclusion under art 
1F. 63 This is inconsistent with the international jurisprudence, and is generally considered an 
incorrect approach.64 However, Lisa Yarwood suggests this was an "unintended" mistake by the 
Court,65 and that responsibility to disentitle a claimant from refugee status "lie[s] elsewhere".66  
Based on its understanding of the Refugee Convention context and the "difficulties of fact-
finding" in refugee law cases, 67 the Court stated that the requirement of "serious reasons for 
considering" goes beyond mere suspicion, but is not equivalent to either the criminal or civil 
standard.68 Beyond that, the Court adopted Sedley LJ's assertion in Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department that "it has to be treated as meaning what it says".69 
B  Consideration of X's Complicity in Crimes Against Humanity 
In the Supreme Court there was no dispute that crimes against humanity were committed by the 
Tamil Tigers between 1985 and 1996. X's exclusion or otherwise from refugee status was based on 
his alleged complicity in these crimes.  
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was accepted as "authoritative 
assistance"70 on what constitutes a crime against humanity, consistently with the recommendations 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.71 The Supreme Court directly applied the 
  
61  Attorney-General v Tamil X, above n 1, at [43]. 
62  At [45]. 
63  At [43]. 
64  Jillian M Siskind "Complicity in Crimes Against Humanity: The Intersection of International Criminal and 
Canadian Refugee Law" (2004) 49 Crim LQ 96 at 123.  
65  Lisa Yarwood "The Return of Tamil X" [2010] NZLJ 369 at 369. 
66  At 369.  
67  At [38]. 
68  At [39]. 
69  At [39], citing Sedley LJ in Al-Sirri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 222 
at [33]. 
70  Attorney-General v Tamil X, above n 1, at [47]. 
71  "Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees", above n 29, at 23. 
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Rome Statute,72 using arts 25.3 and 30, read together. Article 25 deals with individual criminal 
responsibility, and it is art 25.3(d) that is relevant to X's case:73 
3 In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment 
for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 
... 
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by 
a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and 
shall either:  
(i)  Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the 
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; or  
(ii)  Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;  
The requisite mens rea is described in art 30:74 
1 Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent 
and knowledge.   
2  For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:  
(a)  In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;  
(b)  In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it 
will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
3  For the purposes of this article, "knowledge" means awareness that a circumstance exists or a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. "Know" and "knowingly" shall be 
construed accordingly.                      
Under the Rome Statute, international crimes can be committed by direct perpetration, 
encouraging, inciting, aiding, abetting, or joint criminal enterprise. The Supreme Court adopted 
these forms of commission, including the three forms of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) from the 
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić decision of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia 
  
72  At [52]–[53]. 
73  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2187 UNTS 3 (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 
July 2002), art 25. 
74  Article 30. 
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(ICTY).75 JCE will be discussed in detail later in this article; here, it is enough to say that it allows 
for complicity where the claimant has not committed the crime, but has made a contribution to its 
commission through participation in a criminal plan, and it is "a form of criminal liability, rather 
than itself constituting a crime".76 It has three forms which require different levels of intent, and the 
Supreme Court found that X's case involved the most extended form of JCE liability, 77 which 
covers those who share the aim of the initial criminal enterprise, but do not have the intent to 
commit a foreseeable incidental crime.  
C  Consideration of the Relevant Canadian Case Law  
The Court considered the Canadian authority on art 1F, which was ruled to be out-dated by the 
Court of Appeal. It begins with Ramirez v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)78 
which does not address the ICTY concept of JCE, but requires "a shared common purpose and the 
knowledge that all of the parties in question may have of it".79 This is expanded in Bargazan v 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 80  which states that "'personal and knowing 
participation' can be direct or indirect".81 Finally, liability does not require a causal connection 
between the acts of the claimant and the international crimes,82 although following Musagera the 
claimant must have knowledge of the acts that make up the international crime, and risk that their 
acts contribute to it.83 Both the RSAA and the High Court had followed this jurisprudence in X's 
case, and it has been relied upon as persuasive in previous status determinations in New Zealand.84 
D  Consideration of the Relevant English Authority 
The Supreme Court also considered the English jurisprudence followed by the Court of Appeal 
in its ruling on Tamil X. As discussed, the Court of Appeal had relied on an English Court of Appeal 
decision. However, the relevant elements of this decision were overturned by the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court. Therefore, the New Zealand Supreme Court looked instead to the United Kingdom 
  
75  At [54], citing Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić (Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999. 
76  Ibid at [55]. 
77  At [56]. 
78  Ramirez v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1992] 3 FC 306 (FCA). 
79  Ibid at 180. 
80  Bargazan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1996] 205 NR 282 (FCA). 
81  At [11]. 
82  Sumaida v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2000] 3 FC 66 (FCA). 
83  Musagera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), above n 18, at [173]. 
84  Joseph Rikhof "War Criminals Not Welcome: How Common Law Countries Approach the Phenomenon of 
International Crimes in the Immigration and Refugee Context" (2009) 21 IJRL 435 at 479. 
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Supreme Court's decision, which found that the English Court of Appeal's approach had been too 
narrow in requiring that an individual make a significant contribution with the intention of 
furthering the design,85 and found instead that what was required to find a claimant excluded was:86 
... serious reasons for considering him voluntarily to have contributed in a significant way to the 
organisation's ability to pursue its purpose of committing war crimes, aware that his assistance will in 
fact further that purpose. 
Under this ruling, intention to commit "any specifiable crime" is not necessary.87 It is sufficient 
to know of the organisation's crimes and voluntarily make a contribution to their commission. 
Further, a direct link of causation is not required; what is necessary is an element of personal 
responsibility, derived from the personal participation of the claimant. 
E  Conclusions on the Tamil X Case 
On the matter at hand, the Supreme Court concluded that although crimes against humanity 
were committed by the Tamil Tigers during the relevant period, X could not be found to be 
complicit in any of these crimes.88 There was not sufficient evidence to find X was part of a JCE on 
any voyage except the last one. Although his activities on the final voyage of the Yahata were 
sufficient to find that he was personally responsible as part of a JCE, the scuttling of the vessel and 
the subsequent failure to deliver the arms meant that there were no specific completed criminal acts 
of the Tamil Tigers in which X was complicit.89  
The Court stated, however, that:90 
... had it been shown that he participated in voyages where armaments were delivered to the Tamil 
Tigers in Sri Lanka and subsequently that organisation committed crimes against humanity, the position 
would be different. 
Having concluded on art 1F(a), the Court moved on to deal succinctly with art 1F(b), and to 
investigate whether the sinking of the Yahata was a serious non-political crime sufficient to exclude 
X from refugee status. Before the Supreme Court, whether the crime was serious was not disputed; 
the Court addressed only whether the crime was political and whether X was complicit in it.  
  
85  R (JS (Sri Lanka)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 53, at [123]. 
86  R (JS) (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 15, [2011] 1 AC 184 at 
[38]. 
87  Ibid at [37]. 
88  Attorney-General v Tamil X, above n 1, at [79]. 
89  At [78]. 
90  At [79]. 
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The Court found that whether a crime is non-political for the purposes of the Refugee 
Convention depends on whether "the character of the offending is predominantly political or is 
rather that of an ordinary common law crime".91 In this case, due to the political nature of the 
voyage itself, and the specific targeting of the Indian Navy, the crime committed in scuttling the 
Yahata became "sufficiently connected" to the political aims of the Tamil Tigers to be considered a 
political crime.92 
The Court concluded that X was not excluded from refugee status under either art 1F(a) or art 
1F(b) and remitted his case to the RSAA for reconsideration.  
VI ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S JUDGMENT  
The decision in the Supreme Court was laudable. The finding that X could not be excluded as 
there was no completed crime in which he personally was complicit was an important one, and was 
the product of careful analysis. Moreover, the Supreme Court's action in rejecting "mere 
membership" of an organisation as sufficient grounds for exclusion from refugee status will allow 
for status to be determined according to the actions of the applicant, rather than allowing exclusion 
"by association".93 The decision does much to uphold refugees' rights, in applying the Refugee 
Convention as it was written, rather than "to meet any political imperative".94 
There are several issues that are not fully addressed in the judgment of the Supreme Court, and 
so arise for discussion. First, the decision on what precedent to adopt was not explained, and which 
precedent was in fact applied is unclear. Secondly, the JCE in which X was considered to be 
personally responsible is ambiguous in the judgment. Thirdly, it is important to consider the 
relevance of the ICTY jurisprudence to refugee status determinations, given the differences between 
a finding of international criminality and a finding of exclusion from refugee status.  
A Use of Precedent 
This section will consider which jurisdictions were given precedential value in the decision of 
the Supreme Court, the likely reasons for that weighting, and whether the application of the 
precedents was successful.  
The Supreme Court discussed English, Canadian and ICTY jurisprudence, but did not explain or 
clarify which of these authorities it accepted and which it rejected. The Court of Appeal clearly 
stated that the Canadian jurisprudence on art 1F, relied on in the RSAA and in the High Court, was 
  
91  At [90]. 
92  At [96]. 
93  Pia Zambelli "Problematic trends in the analysis of state protection and article 1F(a) exclusion in Canadian 
refugee law" (2011) 23 IJRL 252 at 258. 
94  Lisa Yarwood "The Return of Tamil X", above n 65, at 59.  
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out-dated, and had been replaced by the new English jurisprudence arising from JS (Sri Lanka).95 
However, the Supreme Court is much less definitive. The Refugee Convention was made to be 
interpreted in a "dynamic" manner,96 and is expected to be constantly developing. Further, New 
Zealand is not bound by precedent from any other jurisdiction in this area, though both the Refugee 
Convention and the courts have an expectation of consistency between nations.97 This means that it 
is important to be certain which legal frameworks apply in New Zealand.  
The line of Canadian authority which was dismissed as out-dated at appellate level was 
introduced by the Supreme Court as having "attempted to define" what more than membership was 
necessary to find a JCE, 98 while the words of Lord Brown in (JS) Sri Lanka are cited and 
affirmed.99 Lord Brown's words reflect a principle that the New Zealand Supreme Court viewed as 
central to a determination; that "those who contribute significantly to the commission of an 
international crime with the stipulated intention, although not direct perpetrators of it, are personally 
responsible for the crime".100 The Supreme Court adopted this principle, recognising the importance 
of "maintain[ing] a common approach" to the application of the Refugee Convention 
internationally.101 
On a close analysis, the Canadian jurisprudence and the English jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court in (JS) Sri Lanka are markedly similar. The Canadian jurisprudence, followed in the RSAA 
and High Court, looks to the level of "personal participation" of the claimant. Except in "limited, 
brutal purpose organisations",102 membership of an organisation is not enough to find complicity in 
the Canadian jurisprudence.103 Canada uses the Ramirez approach to determine "how the applicant 
shared in the organisation's common purpose and his or her level of knowledge of the acts of 
  
95  Tamil X v Refugee Status Appeals Authority, above n 51, at [105] per Hammond J, [245] per Baragwanath J. 
96  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees "Guidelines on International Protection: Application of 
the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees", above n 29, at 
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97  Ibid.  
98  Attorney-General v Tamil X, above n 1, at [58]. 
99  At [69]–[70]. 
100  At [70]. 
101  Ibid. 
102  Jillian M Siskind "Complicity in Crimes Against Humanity: The Intersection of International Criminal and 
Canadian Refugee Law", above n 64, at 123. 
103  See generally Joseph Rikhof "War Crimes Law, As Applied in Canada" in Richard Wiggers and Ann 
Griffiths (eds) Modern Global Crises and War Crimes: Canada, Peacekeeping and International 
Humanitarian Law (Halifax, Dalhousie University, 2002) 121. 
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violence".104 Although Ramirez is accepted as correct,105 it is frequently misapplied,106 leading to 
exclusion and "guilt by association".107 The English jurisprudence, drawn from (JS) Sri Lanka, 
requires "no more ... than that the accused had personal knowledge of such aims [of committing art 
1F crimes generally] and intended to contribute to their commission".108 It sees the claimant's actual 
behaviour as the crux of a status decision. 109 Essentially, the Canadian and English tests both 
require actual knowing participation in the common criminal purpose.  
Both the English and Canadian tests are also similar to the ICTY jurisprudence which states:110 
The culpable participant would not need to know of each crime committed. Merely knowing that crimes 
are being committed ... and knowingly participating ... in a way that substantially assists or facilitates the 
commission of a crime or which allows the criminal enterprise to function effectively or efficiently 
would be enough to establish criminal liability.  
Overall, the Supreme Court looked to ICTY authority to outline the different possible forms of 
complicity in crimes against humanity, drawing specifics of what level of participation is needed 
from the Canadian Federal Court cases and using the recent cases from the United Kingdom to 
define the requisite mental element. Therefore, the Supreme Court's approach is either a melding of 
the jurisdictions, or an assertion that they are more similar than the Court of Appeal suggests. 
Unfortunately, the decision lacks the clarity that would make it an effective precedent. However, the 
Supreme Court does make an effective fusion of the three strands, which may be applied in the 
future despite the lack of clear justification or explanation.  
B Joint Criminal Enterprise 
The Rome Statute provides for international crimes to be committed in a number of ways; these 
range from direct perpetration, through encouraging and inciting, aiding and abetting, and being part 
of a JCE. This section will discuss the doctrine of JCE and its application in Tamil X. The Supreme 
Court found X to be participating in a JCE. This means that he did not directly commit any 
international crime himself, but was found to be sufficiently complicit in the war crimes of the 
  
104  James C Simeon "Exclusion Under Article 1F(a) of the 1951 Convention in Canada", above n 34, citing 
James Sloan "The Application of Article 1F of the 1951 Convention in Canada and the United States" 
(2000)12 IJRL 233.  
105  Pia Zambelli "Problematic trends in the analysis of state protection and article 1F(a) exclusion in Canadian 
refugee law", above n 93, at 71.  
106  Ibid.  
107  Ibid.  
108  R (JS) (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 86, at [37]. 
109  Ibid.  
110  Prosecutor v Miroslov Kvočka (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber IT-98-30, 2 November 2001 at [312]. 
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Tamil Tigers to be liable for them. The current conception of a JCE arose in ICTY jurisprudence, 
and it reflects, to a degree, the common law concept of complicity. However, the requirements for 
complicity in an international crime are different to the requirements for complicity in a domestic 
crime,111 and are contained in the Rome Statute.  
JCE is a highly contested doctrine.112 It is the subject of ongoing academic debate, and is often 
criticised as to its scope, levels of required foreseeability, and links between causation and 
culpability.113 It is also criticised for its attribution of liability to those who do not intend to further 
the aims of the criminal enterprise.114 It is suggested by some commentators that its scope is such 
that "the legitimacy of international criminal law will be threatened", 115 as it criminalises too 
broadly. JCE was developed, and is frequently applied, to allow the ICTY to prosecute high-echelon 
offenders,116 who are too far removed from the crime to be considered accomplices.  
The seminal modern case on JCE is Tadić, which addresses the commission of crimes against 
humanity and breaches of the Geneva Conventions by a low-level member of the paramilitary forces 
in the former Yugoslavia. 117  This case outlined the requirements for individual liability for 
complicity in international crimes. The actus reus for a JCE is fulfilled when "there is a plurality of 
persons, a common [criminal] plan and participation of the individual in the execution of the 
common plan".118 The plan need not have been specifically arranged, and it can be inferred from 
the actions of a group.119 An individual becomes liable for the actions of the group if he or she 
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"substantially assisted or significantly affected the furtherance of the goals of the enterprise, with the 
knowledge that his [or her] acts or omissions facilitated the crimes committed through the 
enterprise".120  
The ICTY in Tadić noted that "the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of 
personal culpability".121 To ensure that this principle was upheld, the ICTY outlined three different 
modes of mens rea for the commission of an international crime as part of a joint criminal 
enterprise. The individual can be liable either for acting in pursuance of the criminal purpose with 
intent which is shared by all the members of the enterprise (JCE I),122 or by acting to uphold the 
institution of a concentration camp (JCE II),123 or (JCE III) by acting in:124 
... a common design to pursue one course of conduct where one of the perpetrators commits an act 
which, while outside the common design, was nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the 
effecting of that common purpose. 
The Supreme Court used a JCE analysis in Tamil X, but did not describe the JCE in which it 
considered X complicit. It merely stated that X was part of a JCE which "involves the third category 
of responsibility",125 without outlining the boundary of the criminal enterprise under consideration. 
As adopted by the Supreme Court from Cassese, JCE III requires "participants who agree to the 
main goal ... but do not share the intent that one or more members entertain to also commit crimes 
incidental to the main concerted crime".126 Under such an analysis, in the case at hand, the "main 
concerted crime" must be the carriage of the arms, and the incidental crime, which X did not intend, 
but which must have been foreseeable to X, is the commission of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity by the Tamil Tigers.  
JCE I and JCE III can be seen to be mutually exclusive with regard to X; if JCE I was applied, 
he must have had intent, shared with the Tamil Tigers, to commit crimes against humanity. 
However, if JCE III was applied, he must not have shared the intent to commit crimes against 
humanity, though the crimes were a foreseeable consequence of a crime in which he was complicit. 
The Supreme Court stated that it was using JCE III and although it never explicitly stated that the 
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122  At [196]. 
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carriage of arms was the main crime, this is the only understanding that can reasonably be derived 
from its judgment.  
However, under Baragwanath J's analysis in the Court of Appeal, the carriage of arms could not 
be an international crime. This argument is vital, but it was neither addressed nor overcome by the 
Supreme Court. X must be shown to have been participating in a criminal plan before a JCE 
analysis is available. The scope of liability is only justifiable by considerations of public policy if 
there was an initial criminal plan.127 If the carriage of the arms was a crime, the JCE III analysis can 
proceed, with the commission of crimes against humanity by the Tamil Tigers as the "incidental" 
crime. In this case, X need not be shown to have intended to commit crimes against humanity; their 
commission need only be foreseeable. However, if the carriage of the arms was legal, it is 
unjustifiable to derive criminal liability for crimes against humanity from it.128 
So, was the carriage of the arms by the crew of the Yahata an international crime? In a 
comprehensive survey of international law on the issue, Baragwanath J concluded that transporting 
arms for the Tamil Tigers "may not be treated as per se unlawful",129 because the Tamil Tigers were 
engaged in a legal war, as well as an illegitimate one. This meant it was as likely as not that the arms 
would be used for a legitimate military purpose.130 Baragwanath J concluded that therefore "the 
Crown cannot establish"131 that the arms would be used for the commission of crimes against 
humanity, and it is suggested that "without such a finding it was impossible to find that the appellant 
could have the requisite knowledge needed to satisfy the legal test for those crimes".132 
As stated above, the Supreme Court did not address Baragwanath J's argument, beyond a 
statement that "it matters not on a test based on joint enterprise principles that the actual cargo might 
equally have been used only for legitimate purposes in military operations".133 This is regrettable, 
as the correct analysis of the case hinges on which crime X is seen to be complicit in.  
If the carriage of the arms was not an international crime, the JCE must be the commission of 
crimes against humanity generally by the Tamil Tigers. This means the argument ought to be 
constructed following an analysis according to JCE I requirements, and X's intention to commit 
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crimes against humanity must be proved. It was not proved in the case. Rather, through the 
application of JCE III, it was accepted that X did not have that intent.  
There is further confusion in the adoption by the Supreme Court of (JS) Sri Lanka. The facts in 
that case are very similar. JS was a member of the Tamil Tigers intelligence division who, among 
other activities, led "a mobile unit responsible for transporting military equipment and other 
members of the Intelligence Division through jungles"134 so those members could go armed, in 
plain clothes, to Colombo. He successfully completed this operation for three years, and this was 
considered to be highly relevant to his status determination. 135 Unlike Tamil X, the case was 
decided on JCE I principles; the United Kingdom Supreme Court found JS to have the requisite 
intent to commit war crimes. In the United Kingdom Supreme Court, distinguishing the three 
different types of JCE liability was dismissed as not "especially helpful".136 Although it makes a 
significant difference to the level of intention required, Lord Brown dismissed the third type of 
liability as having "no present relevance" to the case, 137 as he believed that JS was part of a 
common design with the Tamil Tigers to commit crimes against humanity. Confusingly, the 
Supreme Court in Tamil X appeared to adopt the English court's principles, without modification, to 
find liability under JCE III.  
The New Zealand Supreme Court did not find that X had actual intent to commit war crimes, 
and as such could not find him complicit under JCE I. The focus was on his knowledge of the 
crimes, his foresight and risk-taking, 138 which were said to be "the necessary elements of the 
respondent's personal responsibility as part of a joint criminal enterprise".139 This certainly implies 
a discussion of the constructive knowledge required under JCE III. However, an initial crime is 
required for a JCE III analysis. In X's case, the Supreme Court neglected to prove that the carriage 
of the arms aboard the Yahata was an international crime, despite an assertion to the contrary by 
Baragwanath J.  
The Supreme Court's application of JCE principles was unclear at best; at worst it could be seen 
as incorrect. It is unfortunate that there was such a lack of clarity in the application of JCE in this 
case, as a clear and correct understanding of JCE would be beneficial to making fair and transparent 
refugee status determinations in the future.  
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C ICTY Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court in Tamil X adopted the ICTY jurisprudence as authority on interpreting the 
scope of international crimes, and hence in deciding whether or not to exclude a claimant from 
refugee status. This section will describe the marked differences in the function of the Rome Statute 
with regard to art 1F, and the jurisprudence of the ICTY. The role of the ICTY is to ascribe criminal 
culpability, whereas in refugee status determinations the role of the Rome Statute is as an aid to 
interpreting the Refugee Convention, in deciding whether or not to grant refugee status. As such, 
this section will argue that although the ICTY jurisprudence is very useful, the differences are such 
that some alterations to the jurisprudence are required before it can be appropriately adopted for use 
in refugee status determinations.  
A primary difference is the standard of proof. Judgments in international criminal cases require 
a finding "beyond reasonable doubt", while, as has repeatedly been stated, the requirement for 
exclusion from refugee status is "serious reasons for considering" the same crime has been 
committed. Hathaway points out this means that the applicant for refugee status need not have been 
formally charged with, or convicted of, any crime140 and neither is it necessary to have sufficient 
evidence for the claimant to be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime at international law. 
It is enough to have "sufficient proof warranting the assumption of [the claimant's] guilt of such a 
crime",141 a requirement which is not analogous to standards for ordinary judicial proceedings. This 
leads to significantly different requirements for evidence and certainty in each case. The ICTY 
jurisprudence, with its low requirements of mens rea and participation, is appropriate only when a 
criminal standard of proof is required.  
Secondly, JCE means that the ICTY can find wide ranging criminal liability. Under JCE I, "all 
are responsible, whatever their role and position in carrying out the common criminal plan". 142 
Application of this branch has included holding a man liable for waiting in a car while a killing took 
place.143 Under JCE II, responsibility for the crimes committed in a concentration camp is borne if 
the claimants have "knowledge of the serious abuses being perpetrated and willingly take part in the 
functioning of the institution".144 JCE III arises if a risk of the international crime was foreseen, and 
the claimant "willingly took the risk"145 that it would occur. It is not required that the outcome is 
intended, and JCE III has included holding "every person in the crowd who struck a blow" liable for 
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the murder of an airman who was the victim of mob violence.146 It is a doctrine with an incredibly 
broad scope.  
This scope is justified in the ICTY by the requirement for differential sentencing based on levels 
of guilt. Cassese argues that it must be possible "to take account of the lesser degree of culpability of 
the participant",147 as compared to the primary offender, at the sentencing stage. This is seen as 
insufficient justification, even in the criminal context, by several commentators,148 who argue that it 
interferes with proper accounting for individuals' crimes. 149  In contrast, in refugee status 
determinations a finding of culpability as a primary, an accomplice, or a member of a JCE leads to 
the same consequence: exclusion from refugee status. Thus, the justification for the wide scope of 
actions rendered criminal by the JCE doctrine can only be more contentious with regards to a 
refugee status determination which does not allow for differential outcomes. 
Thirdly, the possible consequences of a finding of complicity also differ greatly between ICTY 
and refugee status determinations. The ICTY makes findings of criminality and imposes sentences 
of imprisonment. In contrast, a negative refugee status determination can have as its most severe 
potential consequences arbitrary deprivation of life, or cruel and inhumane punishment, and such 
consequences can apply equally to anyone refused refugee status. This is especially important given 
the recognition that those who are subject to status decisions are generally "from the lower echelons 
of organizations involved in atrocities",150 while those who come before the ICC or ICTY are the 
highest-level offenders.151 
The differences between the findings of international criminality in an ICTY decision and 
findings of exclusion from refugee status are so significant that some changes must be made before 
the ICTY jurisprudence can properly be adopted as the law applicable to refugee status 
determinations. These changes will be considered below in Part VIII.  
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VII POLICY CONSIDERATIONS  
It is important to consider the consequences of the decision in Tamil X for future cases. 
Although X was not excluded from refugee status, he would have been excluded under art 1F(a) if 
he had not failed to deliver the arms to Sri Lanka. The Court of Appeal recognised that if he were 
denied refugee status "the consequences of being returned to Sri Lanka may well be very serious for 
X".152 In similar cases, where the claimant would legitimately be found to be a refugee but for a 
determination of complicity under 1F, the consequences of a negative determination could extend to 
refoulement to torture or arbitrary deprivation of life.153 
Granting refugee status is dependent on a finding that the claimant has a well-founded fear of 
persecution if returned to his or her nation. Such a determination grants the refugee the protections 
provided by the Refugee Convention, including protection against refoulement.154 In New Zealand, 
under the Immigration Act 2009, asylum seekers who do not meet the criteria for refugee status 
under the Refugee Convention have a degree of protection against refoulement, as a designated 
"protected person",155 if return will either put their life at risk or put them at risk of torture. This 
status does not grant them the same rights as refugees.156 When the reason for denial of refugee 
status is exclusion under art 1F, the protection provided depends solely on the discretion of the 
Minister of Immigration. 157 Academic analysis is divided as to what rights regime should be 
applicable to persons excluded from refugee status under art 1F;158 some argue that human rights 
ought to be seen as "rights, not privileges, and cannot be suspended for bad behaviour",159 meaning 
excluded claimants ought to be protected from refoulement. Others, however, argue that a lesser 
rights regime ought to be applicable, potentially allowing refoulement, dependent on the acts of the 
asylum seeker.160  
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Even if refugee status is granted, the protection against refoulement to torture or death is not 
absolute; it is limited by national security under art 33(2) of the Refugee Convention.161 In New 
Zealand, an extra degree of protection is provided by Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2),162 in which 
the Supreme Court held that decisions to deport people who were a security risk had to be made 
consistently with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1991,163 and that therefore if deportation was 
likely to result in death or torture, "a Minister could not set the deportation procedure into train on 
the basis that the continued presence of a person would constitute a threat to national security". 164 
Academic analysis of the judgment has led some commentators to conclude that this is an indirect 
acceptance of a prohibition against refoulement to torture as jus cogens.165 This would provide 
protection from refoulement to torture to "protected persons". However, this suggestion was 
specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in its decision,166 for lack of state practice and judicial 
recognition, 167 though it found that the prohibition of torture was a peremptory norm, which 
required protection.168 Other analysts argue that the proposition that the absolute protection of the 
individual's right not to be refouled over the protection of all other citizens in the state, if there are 
reasonable grounds for finding that the individual is a threat to state security, is not "self-evidently 
correct".169 
Given the uncertainty of the protection provided by the Immigration Act 2009 and by Zaoui 
especially to excluded asylum seekers, whose protection against refoulement depends solely on 
ministerial discretion, a continued vigilance and a restrictive interpretation of the exclusion clauses 
is required to ensure protection of human rights.  
VIII SUGGESTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT 
This article suggests that two changes are necessary to allow the ICTY jurisprudence on JCE to 
effectively and appropriately serve in refugee status determinations. The proposed alterations are 
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based on the differences between the two jurisdictions and the necessity, repeated in the literature, 
for the exclusion clauses to be interpreted "scrupulously and restrictively",170 and applied "only 
where extreme caution has been exercised",171 to best protect genuine refugee claimants.  
The first element of this restrictive interpretation would be to limit what constitutes a 
"significant contribution" to a JCE. It is important for the scope of the word "significant" to be 
clearly understood, as the outcomes of applications for refugee status will hinge on its meaning, and 
at present the concept is nebulous and potentially incredibly far-reaching.   
A "significant contribution" to international crimes has been held to be required for exclusion 
from refugee status. Previously in New Zealand, asylum seekers have been excluded from refugee 
status for complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes for activities such as forced 
conscription of children,172 and presumed torture of civilians while working for the secret police.173 
In other jurisdictions, asylum seekers have been excluded for being a Cabinet Member representing 
an organisation that committed atrocities in Pakistan, 174 for holding leadership positions in the 
LTTE, 175 and for being a cook for the Nigerian army. 176 Certainly, the latter goes too far. 177 
Perhaps Tamil X also went too far in finding that X's participation, as Chief Engineer of the Yahata, 
would have made a significant contribution to the Tamil Tigers' crimes against humanity had the 
arms been delivered. Transporting arms and munitions which may or may not be used for an 
illegitimate purpose is certainly on the lower end what ought to be considered a "significant 
contribution". Either way, it is vital to have the limits of what constitutes a "significant contribution" 
clearly and appropriately defined.  
As a second element, the article suggests that the mens rea standard for complicity in JCE when 
making refugee status decisions ought to be set higher than that required in the ICTY jurisprudence. 
In the case of Tamil X, the Supreme Court applied the ICTY jurisprudence directly and found that 
only knowledge of the international crimes committed and recklessness as to the effects of one's acts 
are required. Given the low requirements of proof, the high consequences of exclusion, and the 
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contested nature of the JCE doctrine, this article argues that the mens rea requirement should be 
higher. Refugee status determinations and ICTY decisions ought to be intentionally differentiated 
with regard to intent.  
This article suggests that the mens rea requirement for determination of refugee status ought to 
be akin to that expressed by the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in (JS) Sri Lanka, and by the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in Tamil X. Rather than recklessness sufficing for a negative 
determination, it should be necessary to find positive intent to contribute. This would lead the 
jurisprudence even further from guilt by association, for which the Canadian jurisprudence has been 
criticised.178 It would also require an ever more stringent consideration of the acts of the claimant, 
and of his mental state, which "ultimately must prove to be the determining factors in any case".179 
IX CONCLUSION 
This article addressed Attorney-General v Tamil X, a recent Supreme Court case on refugee 
status determinations in New Zealand. It is important because it sets out how New Zealand will 
approach art 1F of the Refugee Convention and make its decisions on the exclusion of claimants 
from refugee status. As claims are increasingly affected by art 1F considerations, it is imperative 
that the law in this complicated area is clear and just. This article traced Tamil X's advancement 
through the courts, and detailed the findings in the Supreme Court. It also presented an analysis of 
the Supreme Court's judgment, praising it as laudable, while pointing out some gaps in the clarity of 
its reasoning. The article also suggested some developments for the jurisprudence that would best 
serve to appropriately action the exclusion clauses.  
In Tamil X, the Supreme Court responded to the expectation of the United Nations High 
Commission on Refugees that the law on refugee status continues to actively develop in response to 
changes in the international context. 180  The Supreme Court followed the United Kingdom's 
adoption of the ICTY jurisprudence as a relevant framework for exclusion cases, and created an 
effective synthesis of principles from Canada, the United Kingdom and the ICTY. The author sees 
this as an important step for the clarity, certainty and fairness of future status decisions.  
Significant doubt remains about the protection and status provided by the Immigration Act 2009 
to excluded asylum seekers, despite their classification as "protected persons". As such, a clear and 
restrictive interpretation of the exclusion clauses is required. Proper adoption of the ICTY 
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jurisprudence on JCE will provide a useful framework for the exercise of the exclusion 
jurisprudence internationally, though it is not appropriate to adopt it without some alterations.  
Therefore, as further developments, the article suggests that the ICTY jurisprudence on JCE can 
be appropriately applied if two changes are made to it, to recognise the differing purposes of refugee 
status determinations and ICTY findings of liability. Specifically, a heightened mens rea standard 
and a clear definition of what constitutes a "significant contribution" to a JCE are necessary to best 
protect genuine refugee claimants.  
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